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We explore a replicator-mutator model of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma involving three
strategies: always cooperate (ALLC), always defect (ALLD), and tit-for-tat (TFT). The dynam-
ics resulting from single unidirectional mutations are considered, with detailed results presented
for the mutations TFT → ALLC and ALLD → ALLC. For certain combinations of parameters,
given by the mutation rate µ and the complexity cost c of playing tit-for-tat, we find that the
population settles into limit cycle oscillations, with the relative abundance of ALLC, ALLD,
and TFT cycling periodically. Surprisingly, these oscillations can occur for unidirectional mu-
tations between any two strategies. In each case, the limit cycles are created and destroyed by
supercritical Hopf and homoclinic bifurcations, organized by a Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation.
Our results suggest that stable oscillations are a robust aspect of a world of ALLC, ALLD,
and costly TFT; the existence of cycles does not depend on the details of assumptions of how
mutation is implemented.
Keywords: replicator-mutator model, evolutionary game theory, bifurcation analysis, limit cycle
1. Introduction
Cooperation, where individuals pay costs to benefit others, is a cornerstone of human civilization. By
cooperating, people create value and thus increase the “size of the pie.” This makes a group in which
everyone cooperates better off than a group where everyone is selfish. Cooperation can be difficult to
achieve, however, because creating that collective benefit is often individually costly. How, then, could the
selfish process of natural selection give rise to such altruistic cooperation? Evolutionary game theorists
have devoted a great deal of effort to answering this question [Axelrod, 1984; Boyd et al., 2003; Boyd &
Richerson, 1992; Fowler, 2005; Fu et al., 2008; Fudenberg & Maskin, 1990; Hamilton, 1964; Hauert et al.,
2002; Helbing & Yu, 2009; Manapat et al., 2012; May, 1987; McNamara et al., 2008; Nakamaru et al., 1997;
Nowak, 2006; Nowak et al., 2004; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Rand & Nowak, 2012, 2013; Rand et al.,
2013; Szolnoki et al., 2009; Szolnoki & Szabo´, 2004; Tarnita et al., 2009; Traulsen & Nowak, 2006; Trivers,
1971; Wedekind & Milinski, 2010].
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The standard game-theoretic paradigm for studying cooperation is the Prisoner’s Dilemma [Rapoport,
1965]. Two players simultaneously choose to either cooperate (C) or defect (D), and each receives a payoff
depending on the two choices. Two cooperators both earn the reward of mutual aid R, while two defectors
receive a punishment P . If one player cooperates while the other defects, the defector earns the temptation
payoff T while the cooperator receives the sucker payoff S. If the relationship T > R > P > S holds,
the game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma because mutual cooperation is better than mutual defection (R > P ),
but individually defectors always out-earn cooperators (T > R if the partner cooperates, and P > S if
the partner defects). Thus the Prisoner’s Dilemma captures the tension between individual and collective
interests, the conundrum at the heart of cooperation.
To study the evolution of cooperation, evolutionary game theorists typically combine game theory
with differential equations to create an evolutionary dynamic. The replicator equation is one of the most
common such models [Hofbauer et al., 1979]: strategies with above-average payoffs become more common
over time while strategies with below-average payoffs become less common. As described above, defectors
always out-earn cooperators. Thus in a simple world of pure cooperators versus pure defectors, evolution
via the replicator equation always leads to the extinction of cooperation and a population made up solely
of defectors.
How, then, do we explain the success of cooperation which is so evident in the world around us?
Numerous mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation have been proposed [Nowak, 2006], and empirical
evidence has been provided for their importance in human cooperation [Rand & Nowak, 2013]. Chief
among these mechanisms is direct reciprocity, also known as reciprocal altruism [Axelrod, 1984; Nowak
& Sigmund, 1992, 1993; Rand et al., 2009; Trivers, 1971]: when agents interact repeatedly, evolution can
favor cooperation. If I will only cooperate with you in the next period if you cooperate with me in the
current period, cooperation can be the payoff-maximizing strategy (as long as the game continues to the
next period with high enough probability).
Tit-for-tat (TFT) is the most well-known of these reciprocal strategies. TFT begins by cooperating,
and then merely copies its opponent’s move in the previous period. Thus cooperators receive cooperation
and profit, whereas defectors receive defection and lose out. Moreover, a population in which everyone
plays TFT is resistant to invasion by defectors. If a lone defector is introduced into such a population, that
ALLD player receives a low payoff relative to the resident TFT players. As a result, selection disfavors the
invader and TFT is evolutionarily stable: repeated interactions promote the evolution of cooperation.
Tit-for-tat, however, has an Achilles’ heel [Nowak, 2006]: in some situations it can be invaded by kinder,
gentler strategies [Boyd & Lorberbaum, 1987; Imhof et al., 2005; van Veelen & Garc´ıa, 2010; van Veelen
et al., 2012]. To see this, imagine again a population where everyone plays TFT, except for one player
who always cooperates (ALLC). Both the resident TFT players and the ALLC deviant cooperate in every
round, and thus receive equal payoffs. This means that neutral drift (in the sense of population genetics)
can allow ALLC to increase in frequency, a process called neutral invasion. A more serious weakness of
the TFT players is that other factors can impose costs on them – costs which ALLC players avoid. For
example, TFT is a more sophisticated strategy than ALLC, and hence may incur complexity costs. These
costs arise because TFT needs to spend energy interpreting the other player’s last move before it can
respond appropriately, whereas ALLC is an unconditional strategy. On top of that, the vindictiveness of
TFT can hurt it in noisy or error-prone environments. If players sometimes make mistakes and defect when
they meant to cooperate, such a mistake would go unnoticed by ALLC, but would send two TFT players
into a vendetta of retaliatory defections.
In the presence of such costs, the TFT residents are ultimately overtaken by the ALLC invaders. And
there’s the rub: once ALLC becomes sufficiently common at TFT’s expense, it opens the door to invasion by
nasty, uncooperative ALLD players, who can ruthlessly exploit ALLC and sweep through the population.
Through this sort of scenario, TFT populations can eventually wind up succumbing to defection, suggesting
that cooperation may be doomed even in repeated games.
Here we present a solution to this problem: we show that incorporating mutation into the replicator
equation breaks ALLD’s dominance over the evolutionary outcomes by giving rise to stable cycles involving
substantial levels of cooperation. Surprisingly, it is not necessary for every strategy to mutate into every
other strategy in order to get cyclical behavior, or even for ALLD to mutate into TFT. We find that adding
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any single unidirectional pathway for mutation can lead to stable cycles. Thus we provide evidence that
stable oscillations are a robust aspect of a world of ALLD, ALLC and costly TFT players, and that direct
reciprocity can lead to substantial cooperation even in the face of invasion by unconditional cooperators.
1.1. Relation to previous work
To allow for mutation, the relevant mathematical setting needs to change from the replicator equation to
the replicator-mutator equation [Nowak, 2006; Stadler & Schuster, 1992]. A number of previous authors
have studied limit cycles in replicator-mutator equations, motivated by applications to language change
[Mitchener & Nowak , 2004], autocatalytic chemical reaction networks [Stadler & Schuster, 1992], evolu-
tionary games [Bladon et al., 2010; Galla, 2011; Imhof et al., 2005], and multi-agent decision making [Pais
& Leonard, 2011; Pais et al., 2012].
Our work is most closely related to that of Imhof et al. [2005]. They studied the evolutionary game
dynamics of ALLD, ALLC, and TFT for finite populations, where stochastic effects become important. One
of their most striking results was the observation of the phenomenon mentioned above – an evolutionary
cycle that goes from ALLD to TFT to ALLC and back to ALLD again. Even more remarkably, they found
that the cycle spends nearly all its time lingering in the vicinity of TFT, even though ALLD is a strict
Nash equilibrium!
In the model considered by Imhof et al. [2005], the conditional strategy TFT was assumed to incur a
complexity cost c, relative to the simpler unconditional strategies ALLC and ALLD. Mutation was assumed
to be uniform: every strategy mutates to the other two with equal probability. More precisely, if i 6= j,
strategy i mutates to strategy j with probability µ and stays the same with complementary probability
1− 2µ.
For the deterministic case of infinitely large populations, Imhof et al. [2005] found that for certain com-
binations of parameters c and µ, the replicator-mutator equations have a stable limit cycle, corresponding
to the evolutionary cycles observed in their simulations. They mentioned bifurcations associated with the
birth and death of the limit cycle, but did not present a bifurcation analysis or a stability diagram to locate
the bifurcation curves in the (µ, c) parameter space.
We were curious to learn more about the evolutionary cycle seen in the infinite population model.
What bifurcations create and destroy this limit cycle? How does its bifurcation structure depend on the
details of how the mutations are implemented, in a graph-theoretic sense? That is, if we think of the three
strategies as the vertices of a triangle graph, with mutations occurring along the edges between them, the
uniform mutation case studied by Imhof et al. [2005] amounts to a complete graph with equal weights µ
on its six directed edges. What would happen, by contrast, in the opposite extreme case of unidirectional
mutation along one of these six directed edges?
We found that for all six possible unidirectional mutations, a stable limit cycle exists in a certain part
of (µ, c) space. The cycle always oscillates in the same rotational sense, moving from the neighborhood of
ALLD to TFT to ALLC and back toward ALLD again, just as it does in the case of uniform mutation.
Moreover, the commonalities extend to the types and locations of the bifurcations that create and destroy
the cycle. The region in parameter space where stable limit cycles exist is always bounded on one side by a
curve of supercritical Hopf bifurcations and on the other side by a curve of homoclinic bifurcations. These
two curves meet tangentially at a Bogdanov-Takens point at one end of the stability region for the limit
cycle. All of these statements are true of the uniform mutation case as well.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the formulation of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma and its associated replicator equation, followed by their generalization to the replicator-
mutator equation. Then we focus on two special cases of unidirectional mutation, TFT → ALLC and
ALLD → ALLC, and summarize the results from the other four cases, as well as for the case of uniform
mutation. The paper concludes with a conjecture and a brief discussion.
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2. Model
2.1. Prisoner’s Dilemma
Following Axelrod [1984], we fix the parameter values T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0. These satisfy the
inequalities required for the game to qualify as a Prisoner’s Dilemma: T > R > P > S and R > (T + S) /2.
The final inequality implies that if the two players play many rounds with one another, it is better for
both of them to cooperate all the time rather than engage in alternating bouts of getting suckered and
suckering the other.
Now consider a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma among players using the strategies ALLC, ALLD, and
TFT. Then, in the limit where the players meet infinitely often and there is no discounting of future
interactions, their average payoffs are given by the payoff matrix given in Table 1 (the entries show the
average payoff that the row player gets when playing against the specified column player):
Table 1. Payoff matrix of repeated
prisoner’s dilemma
ALLD TFT ALLC
ALLD P P T
TFT P R R
ALLC S R R
For example, an ALLC player gets suckered every time against an ALLD player, and therefore receives an
average payoff of S in their depressing encounters. But when TFT plays ALLD, it gets suckered only on
the first round, but after that it reciprocates each defection with defection, leading to an infinitely long
string of mutual defections and hence an average payoff of P .
2.2. Replicator equation
Next we set the game in an evolutionary framework. If each strategy reproduces at a rate proportional to
its relative fitness, the resulting dynamics can be approximated by the following set of ordinary differential
equations, known as the replicator equations:
x˙ = x (fx − φ)
y˙ = y (fy − φ)
z˙ = z (fz − φ) . (1)
Here x, y and z denote the fractions of the population playing ALLD, TFT, and ALLC, respectively; fi is
the fitness of strategy i, defined as its expected payoff against the current mix of strategies; and
φ = xfx + yfy + zfz (2)
is the average fitness in the whole population. By summing the differential equations for x˙, y˙, and z˙, one
can verify that x+ y+ z = 1 for all time, as required by the definition of x, y and z as relative frequencies.
The payoff matrix for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma implies that the fitnesses are given by
fx = xP + yP + zT
fy = xP + yR+ zR
fz = xS + yR+ zR. (3)
For the parameter values T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, and S = 0 assumed above, and by replacing z with 1−x−y,
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we find that the fitnesses reduce to
fx = 5− 4x− 4y
fy = 3− 2x
fz = 3− 3x (4)
and the average fitness in the population becomes φ = 3− x (1 + x+ 3y) .
The phase portrait for the replicator equation (1) with fitnesses (4) can be drawn in the (x, y) plane,
by eliminating z via z = 1 − x − y. Unfortunately this way of presenting the phase portrait has certain
disadvantages. It distorts the geometry of the trajectories and it arbitrarily highlights two of the strategies
at the expense of the third. In the original (x, y, z) phase space, the phase portrait lives on the equilateral
triangle defined by the face of the simplex x + y + z = 1, where 0 ≤ x, y, z ≤ 1. Thus, a more appealing
and symmetrical approach is to show the phase portrait as it actually appears on simplex. The following
change of variables achieves this goal: (
X
Y
)
=
(
1 12
0
√
3
2
)(
x
y
)
(5)
Equation (5) can be shown to be equivalent, up to a uniform scaling and a translation, to the change of
variables given by Eq. 35 in Wesson & Rand [2013].
Figure 1 plots the resulting phase portrait. The first thing to note is that it contains a saddle point
at (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0), corresponding to the entire population at ALLD. The fact that the ALLD corner
is a saddle point, rather than a stable fixed point, reflects our simplifying assumptions that the game is
infinitely repeated with no discounting of future interactions; in effect, the first round of the game is totally
ignored. Without these assumptions, a standard result in repeated games [Nowak, 2006] is that there is
bistability along the ALLD-TFT edge. In that case the ALLD corner would have a basin of attraction
whose size depends on the payoffs.
Fig. 1. Phase portrait of system (1) with c = 0 and µ = 0.
Second, observe that Fig. 1 displays a line of neutrally stable fixed points along the side joining ALLC
to TFT, where ALLD is absent. Neutral drift takes place along this side in finite populations. In the infinite
population case shown here, the system almost always ends up in a nirvana of cooperation, with a mix of
TFT and ALLC determined by the initial conditions, and with ALLD extinct.
However, the line of neutrally stable fixed points in this phase portrait is a structurally unstable feature.
If the governing equations are perturbed by the addition of arbitrarily small terms, one expects that the
line of fixed points will break and be replaced by something qualitatively different.
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Table 2. Payoff matrix of replicator
model with cost.
ALLD TFT ALLC
ALLD P P T
TFT P − c R− c R− c
ALLC S R R
Indeed, when we associate a small complexity cost c to playing TFT, the payoff matrix changes to
that shown in Table 2:
The new fitnesses become
fx = 5− 4x− 4y
fy = 3− c− 2x
fz = 3− 3x (6)
and
φ = 3− cy − x(1 + x+ 3y). (7)
In the corresponding phase portraits, shown in Fig. 2, the previous line of neutrally stable fixed points
turns into an invariant line with the vector field flowing from a saddle point at TFT to another saddle
point at ALLC.
(a) 0 < c <
2
3
(b)
2
3
≤ c < 2 (c) c ≥ 2
Fig. 2. Phase portrait of system (1) with c > 0 and µ = 0.
The structure of the rest of the phase portrait depends on the size of c, as shown in Fig. 2, but the long-term
behavior of the system is the same in all three cases: ALLD takes over and cooperation dies out.
Notice that none of the phase portraits so far contain any limit cycles. This could have been anticipated
from a general theorem that forbids limit cycles in any system of replicator equations involving n = 3
strategies, for any game and any payoff matrix [Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998]. Periodic solutions can exist,
but only within continuous families of neutrally stable cycles. Such periodic orbits are not isolated and
hence do not qualify as limit cycles.
3. Replicator-Mutator Equation
Limit cycles do, however, become possible when we allow ALLD, ALLC, and TFT to mutate into one
another. For simplicity, let us restrict attention to single unidirectional mutations only. Then there are six
possibilities.
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3.1. Example 1: TFT → ALLC
In this case, we assume that after replication occurs, a player with strategy TFT mutates to ALLC with
probability µ. Then the replicator-mutator system is
x˙ = x (fx − φ)
y˙ = y (fy − φ)− µyfy. (8)
where x, y, and z denote the frequencies of ALLD, TFT, and ALLC, respectively. Note that as before, we
have chosen to eliminate z from the equations by using the identity z = 1 − x − y. Likewise, we do not
write the equation for z˙ explicitly, since it can be obtained from x˙ and y˙ if needed via z˙ = −x˙− y˙.
After insertion of (6) and (7) into (8), the replicator-mutator system becomes
x˙ = x [(c− 4) y + x (x+ 3y − 3) + 2] ,
y˙ = y [c (µ+ y − 1)− 3µ+ x (2µ+ x+ 3y − 1)] . (9)
The right hand side is cubic in x and y. With the help of computer algebra, one can calculate the fixed
points for the system, all but one of which lie on the boundary of the simplex (the equilateral triangle).
Explicit formulas for these fixed points are presented in Appendix A. We have also calculated the curves
in (µ, c) space at which the interior fixed point undergoes saddle-node and supercritical Hopf bifurcations;
see Appendix A for details. As the parameters are varied, the stable limit cycles that are created by the
supercritical Hopf bifurcation are later destroyed by a homoclinic bifurcation. The associated curve of
homoclinic bifurcations was computed numerically with the help of the continuation package MATCONT
[Govaerts & Kuznetsov, 2008].
Figure 3 plots the bifurcation curves in (µ, c) space. The saddle-node curve is shown in blue, the Hopf
curve in red, and the homoclinic curve in green. These curves partition the parameter space into four
regions, marked 1, 2, 3, and 4 on the figure.
Fig. 3. Stability diagram in (µ, c) space when TFT → ALLC. Saddle-node curve, blue; supercritical Hopf curve, red; homo-
clinic curve, green; BT, Bogdanov-Takens point.
Figure 4 shows representative phase portraits for each of the four regions. In region 1, ALLD wipes
out the other two strategies. (This makes sense intuitively. In region 1, TFT pays a high cost in fitness
compared to the other two strategies. Furthermore, because µ is large in region 1, TFT mutates rapidly into
ALLC, which in turn is clobbered by ALLD.) In region 2, a new pair of fixed points exist; they were created
in a saddle-node bifurcation on the right-hand boundary of the equilateral triangle when the parameters
crossed the saddle-node bifurcation curve. The unstable spiral seen in region 2 is the descendant of that
node. Despite the existence of these two new fixed points, the system’s long-term behavior remains the
same as in region 1: almost all trajectories approach ALLD.
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(a) Region 1 (b) Region 2
(c) Region 3 (d) Region 4
Fig. 4. Phase portrait of system (9) in different regions of (µ, c) space when TFT → ALLC. The stable limit cycle is shown
in red.
In region 3, however, a new attractor – a stable limit cycle, shown in red in Fig. 4(c) – coexists with
ALLD. Where did this limit cycle come from? It emerged from a homoclinic orbit. When the parameters
lie on the homoclinic bifurcation curve between region 2 and region 3, a homoclinic orbit starts and ends
at the newly created saddle (the one close to the side between TFT and ALLD). This homoclinic orbit
becomes a stable limit cycle when the parameters lie in region 3.
Finally, as we move from region 3 toward region 4, the limit cycle shrinks and ultimately becomes a
point (a stable spiral) at the supercritical Hopf curve (the red curve in Fig. 3). When we move into the
interior of region 4 the system becomes bistable, with the stable spiral sharing the state space with ALLD.
In biological terms, the population displays substantial levels of cooperation when it is on either the
stable limit cycle of region 3 or the stable spiral of region 4.
3.2. Example 2: ALLD → ALLC
Now we consider an alternative scenario of unidirectional mutation. Suppose that after replication occurs,
each player with strategy ALLD mutates into ALLC with probability µ. Notice that this example shares
one potentially important feature with Example 1 – in both cases, the target mutant being created is ALLC.
On the other hand, this example differs from Example 1 in that the source of the mutant is now ALLD,
not TFT. Which matters more: the commonality of the target or the non-commonality of its source?
It turns out that the commonality of the target is more important. To see this, observe that in the
presence of ALLD → ALLC mutations, the replicator-mutator system becomes
x˙ = x (fx − φ)− µxfx,
y˙ = y (fy − φ) (10)
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and z = 1−x− y, where x, y, and z again denote the frequencies of ALLD, TFT, and ALLC, respectively.
After insertion of (6) and (7) into (10), the replicator-mutator system yields
x˙ = x[(c− 4) y − 5µ+ 4µ (x+ y) + x (x+ 3y − 3) + 2],
y˙ = y[c (y − 1) + x (x+ 3y − 1)]. (11)
Figure 5 plots the stability diagram in (µ, c) space. Note how much it resembles Fig. 3. In both cases,
the parameter space divides into four regions bounded by curves of supercritical Hopf (red), saddle-node
(blue) and homoclinic (green) bifurcations, all of which emerge from a Bogdanov-Takens point. The main
difference is that the red curve of Hopf bifurcations goes through the origin in Fig. 3 and not in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Stability diagram in (µ, c) space when ALLD → ALLC. Saddle-node curve, blue; supercritical Hopf curve, red;
homoclinic curve, green; BT, Bogdanov-Takens point. Formulas for the Hopf and saddle-node bifurcation curves are given in
Appendix B. The homoclinic curve was computed using MATCONT.
Figure 6 shows the phase portraits corresponding to the four regions. As in Example 1, defection
dominates the long-term dynamics in regions 1 and 2, where a stable fixed point close to ALLD attracts
almost all solutions. (Note that pure ALLD is no longer a fixed point, because of the assumed mutations
from ALLD to ALLC. That is why the globally attracting fixed point lies between ALLD and ALLC. We
will refer to this fixed point as “almost ALLD.”) In region 3, a stable limit cycle (shown in red) coexists
with almost ALLD. In region 4, the limit cycle no longer exists; it has contracted to a stable spiral fixed
point via the supercritical Hopf bifurcation between regions 3 and 4.
It is important to realize that the population exhibits large amounts of cooperation when it is in the
stable spiral state or cycling periodically. This becomes clear when one looks at time series instead of
phase portraits. Figure 7 shows the approach to a stable limit cycle in which ALLD is nearly absent except
during brief spikes, whereas ALLC and TFT predominate for most of the cycle. Thus, the stable limit cycle
signifies more than just an avoidance of all-out defection; it represents a state of significant cooperation.
3.3. Other single unidirectional mutations
Four other types of single unidirectional mutations are possible: ALLD → TFT, ALLC → TFT, ALLC →
ALLD, and TFT→ ALLD. Using the techniques above, we have analyzed these remaining cases completely.
But rather than wade through the details, it seems clearer and more useful to summarize the main results,
which are as follows.
For all four cases, the phase portraits and the bifurcation curves are more complicated than those
presented in Examples 1 and 2. Nevertheless, all of them display stable limit cycles in some region of the
parameter space. Specifically, the region in (µ, c) space where stable limit cycles exist is always bounded
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(a) Region 1 (b) Region 2
(c) Region 3 (d) Region 4
Fig. 6. Phase portrait of system (11) in different regions of (µ, c) space when ALLD→ ALLC. The stable limit cycle is shown
in red.
on one side by a curve of supercritical Hopf bifurcations, and on the other side by a curve of homoclinic
bifurcations. Both curves emanate from a Bogdanov-Takens point.
What we find most intriguing is that the homoclinic bifurcation curve – the counterpart of the green
curve in Figs. 3 and 5 – always passes through the origin (µ, c) = (0, 0). Hence stable limit cycles always
exist for arbitrarily small perturbations of the original system (1) with fitnesses (4), no matter how the
mutation is implemented.
This is the sense in which limit cycles are “sparked by mutation” in the Prisoner’s Dilemma among
ALLC, ALLD, and TFT. If just one of the strategies can mutate into just one of the others, it takes only
an infinitesimal cost c and an infinitesimal mutation probability µ for the system to display self-sustained
oscillations, with large amounts of cooperation during part of the cycle. In this way, the slightest bit of
mutation allows the population to avoid a collapse into all-out defection.
3.4. Uniform global mutation
So far we have focused on a very restricted class of mutation pathways: single unidirectional mutations,
in which exactly one strategy mutates into exactly one other. But we suspect that the sparking of limit
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(a) ALLD (b) TFT
(c) ALLC
Fig. 7. Time series for a solution of system (11) as it approaches the stable limit cycle. Notice that the level of cooperation
is high during much of the cycle, as shown by the high combined levels of ALLC and TFT, while ALLD remains low except
for brief spikes. Parameter values: (µ, c) = (0.08, 0.04).
cycles by mutation is more general.
For example, consider the extreme opposite case of uniform global mutation, where each strategy
mutates to the other two with probability µ, and hence stays the same with probability 1 − 2µ. The
replicator-mutator equations for this case are given by
x˙ = x [fx (1− 2µ)− φ] + µfyy + µfzz
y˙ = y [fy (1− 2µ)− φ] + µfxx+ µfzz (12)
where z = 1− x− y. Substitution of (6) and (7) into (12) yields
x˙ = µ [x (11x+ 9y − 16)− cy] + x [(c− 4) y + x (x+ 3y − 3) + 2] + 3µ,
y˙ = cy (2µ+ y − 1) + 3µ+ x2 (y − µ) + x (3y − 1) (µ+ y)− 9µy. (13)
Figure 8 plots the stability diagram in (µ, c) space, showing the curves where supercritical Hopf (red),
saddle-node (blue) and homoclinic (green) bifurcations take place. The diagram splits into five regions. All
the bifurcation curves of this system were computed using MATCONT [Govaerts & Kuznetsov, 2008].
Figure 9 shows the phase portraits corresponding to the five regions. As in the earlier examples 1
and 2, defection prevails in regions 1 and 2, where a stable fixed point close to ALLD attracts almost all
solutions. In region 3, the possibility of cooperation reemerges: a stable limit cycle (shown in red) coexists
with a stable node near ALLD. In region 4, the limit cycle becomes a global attractor; the stable node of
region 3 is lost in a saddle-node bifurcation when the parameters move from region 3 to 4. The limit cycle
no longer exists in region 5.
3.5. Conjecture
In every one of the examples considered so far, the region where stable limit cycles exist extends all the way
down to the origin in parameter space. This means that limit cycles can be sparked by an arbitrarily small
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Fig. 8. Stability diagram in (µ, c) space for the case of uniform global mutation. Saddle-node curve, blue; supercritical Hopf
curve, red; homoclinic curve, green; BT, Bogdanov-Takens point; CP, cusp point. The bifurcation curves were computed using
MATCONT.
mutation probability µ, if the complexity cost c of TFT is also suitably small. These results have been
obtained for topologies at opposite ends of the graph-theoretic spectrum: single unidirectional mutation (in
which mutation occurs along one directed edge) and uniform global mutation (in which mutation occurs
in both directions along the edges of the complete graph).
We conjecture, therefore, that a similar sparking of stable limit cycles occurs for any pattern of muta-
tion. To make this statement precise, we write down the general form of the replicator-mutator equation.
Let the frequencies of the three strategies ALLD, TFT and ALLC be denoted as x1, x2, x3 rather than
x, y, z. Then the replicator-mutator dynamics are given by
x˙i =
 3∑
j=1
xjfjQji
− xiφ (14)
for i = 1, 2, 3. Here fi is the fitness of strategy i (obtained from Eq. (4), as before), φ =
∑3
j=1 xjfj is the
average fitness in the population, and Qij is the probability that players with strategy i mutate to playing
strategy j. Since the Qij represent probabilities, they are non-negative and satisfy
∑
j Qij = 1; hence the
matrix Q is row stochastic. In the limiting case where mutation does not occur, Q is the identity matrix
and Qij = δij where δij is the Kronecker delta.
Now suppose that mutation does occur, and that it can be characterized by a mutation matrix M and
a single parameter 0 < µ ≤ 1 such that
Qij = δij − µMij . (15)
Any matrix M that maintains the row-stochasticity and non-negativity of Q is admissible. This diversity
of M is what we mean by any pattern of mutation.
Phrased in these terms, our conjecture is that for any fixed, admissible M , one can find an open set
of parameters (µ, c) arbitrarily close to (0, 0) such that stable limit cycles exist for the replicator-mutator
system (14).
We have verified this conjecture informally for a handful of admissible mutation matrices M , but
we have not done a comprehensive numerical study nor do we have analytical evidence to support the
conjecture. So it could well be false. But we suspect it is true. A key step toward proving it would be to
demonstrate that a curve of homoclinic bifurcations (the counterpart of the green curves in Figs. 3, 5, and
8) always emanates from the point (µ, c) = (0, 0), for any admissible M .
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(a) Region 1 (b) Region 2
(c) Region 3 (d) Region 4
(e) Region 5
Fig. 9. Phase portrait of system (13) in different regions of (µ, c) parameter space. The stable limit cycle is shown in red.
4. Discussion
Our results show that a variety of different mutation structures give rise to evolutionary cycles of coop-
eration and defection in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. These cycles appear to be a robust feature of
interactions in well-mixed populations of ALLC, ALLD and TFT, rather than being specific to particular
assumptions regarding the mutation matrix. These cycles, as well as the stable spirals created by mutation
in other parts of the (µ, c) parameter space, lead to substantial levels of cooperation. Thus the grim picture
painted by the standard replicator equation without mutation, in which ALLD dominates even in repeated
games, may be too pessimistic.
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The replicator equation assumes that the population is well mixed. In some settings it is more realistic
to regard the population as spatially structured, with players interacting only with a fixed subset of others
on a regular lattice. Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection among ALLC, ALLD, and TFT can
occur in this case too, even in the absence of mutation [Szolnoki et al., 2009]. Similar cycles occur for
populations playing a spatial version of the rock-paper-scissors game [Szolnoki & Szabo´, 2004].
Although the replicator equation is typically thought of as describing genetic evolution, it can just as
well describe a social learning dynamic in which people imitate the strategies of more successful others. In
this context, mutation corresponds to experimentation or innovation, i.e., trying out a strategy other than
the one which is performing well at the moment. Experimentation is a key element of human behavior
[Rand et al., 2013; Traulsen et al., 2010], and our results suggest that it may also help to explain the
success of cooperation in human societies.
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Appendix A TFT → ALLC
For Example 1 of the main text, in which TFT mutates into ALLC, the system (8) has at most 4 fixed
points (x∗, y∗) in the simplex x+ y + z = 1, with 0 ≤ x, y, z ≤ 1:
(x∗1, y
∗
1) = (0, 0) is a saddle,
(x∗2, y
∗
2) = (1, 0) is a stable node,
(x∗3, y
∗
3) =
(
A1 − 5cµ+ c+ 17µ+ 2
12µ+ 4
,
−(µ+ 1)A1 − cµ2 + 8cµ+ c+ µ2 − µ+ 2
24µ+ 8
)
is a saddle, and
(x∗4, y
∗
4) =
(−A1 − 5cµ+ c+ 17µ+ 2
12µ+ 4
,
(µ+ 1)A1 − cµ2 + 8cµ+ c+ µ2 − µ+ 2
24µ+ 8
)
, could be a stable or
unstable spiral (or node), depending on µ and c [Strogatz, 1994], where in the formulas above,
A1 =
√
c2(µ+ 3)2 − 2c((µ− 11)µ+ 6) + (µ− 28)µ+ 4.
The fixed points (x∗1, y∗1), (x∗2, y∗2), and (x∗3, y∗3) are on the boundary of the simplex and (x∗4, y∗4) is
inside the simplex. A saddle-node bifurcation occurs when (x∗3, y∗3) and (x∗4, y∗4) coalesce and disappear.
The equation of the saddle-node bifurcation curve is
c =
(µ− 11)µ− 4√6√µ(3µ+ 1) + 6
(µ+ 3)2
. (A.1)
The fixed point (x∗4, y∗4) undergoes a supercritical Hopf bifurcation and switches from a stable spiral
to an unstable spiral at certain parameter values. The equation of the Hopf bifurcation curve, which was
computed analytically, is
c = − 3− 13µ
4 (µ− 1) −
1
2
√
A2 +
A4
3
3
√
2(µ− 1)2 +
A5
3(µ− 1)2A4
(A.2)
+
1
2
√√√√√√A2 −
A4
3
3
√
2(µ− 1)2 −
A5
3(µ− 1)2A4
+
A6
4
√
A7 +
A4
3
3
√
2(µ− 1)2 +
A5
3(µ− 1)2A4
(A.3)
where
A2 =
(3− 13µ)2
4(µ− 1)2 +
35µ2 − 34µ− 8
3 (µ2 − 2µ+ 1) −
35µ2 − 34µ− 8
(µ− 1)2 ,
A3 = (−5240604096µ12 − 40578465024µ11 + 200756188800µ10 − 265354820640µ9 + 60401533248µ8 +
110419920576µ7 − 55059298560µ6 − 12327872544µ5 + 4987630080µ4 + 1779338880µ3 + 218439936µ2 −
110592µ− 1880064) 12 ,
A4 = (204136µ
6 − 578832µ5 + 416952µ4 + 51238µ3 − 79740µ2 − 12984µ+A3 − 1456) 13 ,
A5 =
3
√
2
(
2272µ4 − 3160µ3 + 521µ2 + 316µ+ 100) ,
A6 = −(3− 13µ)
3
(µ− 1)3 +
4
(
35µ2 − 34µ− 8) (3− 13µ)
(µ− 1)3 −
8
(
49µ2 − 4µ+ 4)
(µ− 1)2 , and
A7 =
35µ2 − 34µ− 8
3 (µ2 − 2µ+ 1) −
35µ2 − 34µ− 8
(µ− 1)2 .
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Appendix B ALLD → ALLC
For Example 2 of the main text, in which ALLD mutates into ALLC, system (10) has at most 5 fixed
points (x∗, y∗) in the simplex x+ y + z = 1, with 0 ≤ x, y, z ≤ 1:
(x∗1, y
∗
1) = (0, 0) is a saddle,
(x∗2, y
∗
2) = (0, 1) is a saddle,
(x∗3, y
∗
3) =
(
1
2
(
−4µ−
√
4µ(4µ− 1) + 1 + 3
)
, 0
)
is a stable node,
(x∗4, y
∗
4) =
(
−4cµ+A8 + c− 11µ+ 2
16µ− 4 ,
8cµ2 − 10cµ+ (2µ− 1)A8 + c+ 18µ2 − 11µ+ 2
8(µ− 1)(4µ− 1)
)
is a saddle,
and
(x∗5, y
∗
5) =
(−4cµ+A8 − c+ 11µ− 2
16µ− 4 ,
8cµ2 − 10cµ− (2µ− 1)A8 + c+ 18µ2 − 11µ+ 2
8(µ− 1)(4µ− 1)
)
could be a
stable or unstable spiral (or node), depending on µ and c. In the expressions above,
A8 =
√
(4cµ+ c− 11µ+ 2)2 + 8c(4µ− 1)(−c+ µ+ 2).
The fixed points (x∗1, y∗1), (x∗2, y∗2), and (x∗3, y∗3) are on the boundary of the simplex, and (x∗4, y∗4) and
(x∗5, y∗5) are in the interior. A saddle-node bifurcation occurs when (x∗4, y∗4) and (x∗5, y∗5) coalesce and disap-
pear. The equation of the saddle-node bifurcation curve is
c =
µ (28µ− 25) + 6− 4√6√(1− µ)µ(3µ− 2)(4µ− 1)
(3− 4µ)2 . (B.1)
The fixed point (x∗5, y∗5) undergoes a supercritical Hopf bifurcation and switches from a stable spiral
to an unstable spiral at the curve given by
c = −
(
1− i√3)A10
6 3
√
2
+
(
1 + i
√
3
) (
48µ3 − 201µ2 + 114µ− 33)
3 22/3A10
+ 2µ+ 1 (B.2)
where
A9 =
√
4 (48µ3 − 201µ2 + 114µ− 33)3 + (−2592µ4 + 5670µ3 − 5022µ2 + 810µ+ 162)2
and
A10 =
3
√
−2592µ4 + 5670µ3 − 5022µ2 +A9 + 810µ+ 162.
